Priorities

The 10 March 2023 meeting of the leadership of the recently established National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC) with the Tigray regional officials was a major positive step. The head of the Commission Ambassador Teshome Toga led the delegation to Mekelle and met with the newly appointed head of the Interim Regional Administration (IRA) Getachew Redda, members of the civil society in Tigray. The presence of Turhan Saleh, resident representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Ethiopia, who is supporting the program was also seen as a demonstration of increasing cooperation between Addis, Mekele and the international community to coordinate resource mobilization and implementation for the DDR. On 23 March 2023, the government unveiled the National Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDRP) for ex- combatants developed by the National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC). The program was presented for members of the diplomatic community. The NRC was established by the Government in November 2022 for with a two-year mandate to assist with demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants across the country.

The start of the war saw all of the security structures in Tigray transformed into Tigray Defence Forces (TDF). Transforming the TDF into a regional security institution requires democratic accountability and civilian oversight of the TDF at the regional and federal levels. Reintegrating its leadership and soldiers in the federal security institutions will be a complex process. The reintegration of former TDF combatants in the post-conflict period will require a thorough security sector reform roadmap. The process may require the creation of  overarching national standards on the size, training, weapons, command structure, and mandate of regional security forces, depending on the population size, territory, and security needs. The African Union could coordinate international support for this effort through the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework, the Africa Union’s mechanism to support recovery and reconstruction needs of countries and communities emerging from conflict.

Launching a nationwide and regional demobilisation, and reintegration programmes, for non-state and informal armed groups and movements, will be critical in order to demilitarise Ethiopia’s public and political spaces. 

Relations between Addis and Asmara are deteriorating. Improving relations between Addis and Mekelle, the widening differences between Amhara and Oromia chapters of the Prosperity Party and accusations of clandestine cooperation between Amhara and Eritrean security establishments is harming the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Addis Ababa’s improving relations and accelerated rapprochement with the West, the March 2023 visit of Secretary Blinken to Ethiopia and the delisting of the TPLF by the Ethiopian parliament on 22 March 2023 are received with disapproval and suspicion by Asmara. The possibility of including Eritrea as a stakeholder of the peace and recovery process in Tigray and Ethiopia is increasingly looking distant.

There is a risk that progress in the political and security elements of the Pretoria agreement and the transitional justice initiatives of the Ethiopian government could be perceived as replacement for accountability. There are signs that the government may micromanage the outcomes of the local investigation and may not open to findings of government culpability.

On January 2023, the Ethiopian government published a draft Policy Options for Transitional Justice.  The document is used for a public awareness and consultation with key local and international stakeholders to explore possible avenues and timeframe of addressing peace and justice.

The wounds, crimes and trauma of the war and bitter divisions over the identity and ownership of Western and Southern Tigray continue to shape elite and communal relations of the two groups. Areas bordering the two regions remain militarized and political and security alliance between Amhara and Eritrean political and security establishments inform continued mistrust.

The 22 March 2023 decision by Ethiopia’s House of People’s Representatives to remove The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), from a list of terrorist organisations could facilitate the TPLF and the Tigray region to take a role in the National Dialogue process. The decision took place at the backdrop of encouraging security and political progress with the Pretoria agreement. However, the National Dialogue still suffers from lack of legitimacy among the major opposition groups.

On 09 February 2023, the Tigray Orthodox Church Council rejected a call by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) Holy Synod’s Secretariat for reconciliation and normalization of relations between the Synod in Addis Ababa and Tigray Orthodox Church. The Tigray Orthodox Church severed ties with the Synod in Addis accusing the EOTC of taking a partial role in the war. A statement by members of the Council of Bishops of Tigray Orthodox Church accused the EOC of endorsing what it said was a “war of genocide” declared on the people of Tigray. On 23 March 2023, the EOC made a statement rejecting the Tigray Church as a structure that violates “the institutional unity and existing structural organization of our church.” The January 2023 establishment of the Oromia Synod opposing the EOC also further weekend the image and capacity of EOC to play a role in ongoing peace and political processes. The division was driven by structural and political factors that are also shaping the broader political and social spaces in Ethiopia. Despite the February 2023 settlement between the rebelling Oromo archbishops and the EOC, the deal is fragile and under massive pressure from immediate and structural issues. Addressing contentions issues including the newly appointed bishops by splinter groups and rebuilding trust between the archbishops and the ecosystem in the EOC are proving difficult. In the mid and long term, the division set a precedence that could inspire future and further rebellion especially in the situation of delays from the EOC to respect or implement the terms of the deal.

The establishment of the Interim Regional Administration and the approval of the appointment of Getachew Reda as head of the body by PM Abiy Ahmed on 22 March 2023 raised hopes of enhanced cooperation for humanitarian access. The decision could facilitate and accelerate efforts to institutionalize a permanent mechanism focused on the issue of ensuring humanitarian access, which is well-structured and led, possibly composed of the United Nations, the federal and Tigray governments, the African Union, the EU, the US, and selected members of NGOs, could be a way to address logistical, security, and communication challenges in aid delivery.

It is clear that large parts of northern Ethiopia must be completely rebuilt (see below), with some estimates putting the cost of reconstruction in the next three years up to $20 billion. This monumental task is even more challenging given that Ethiopia’s macroeconomy is currently on the brink of collapse—and not simply because of the costs of the conflict. Like many countries around the world, Ethiopia has been hit hard by the global rise in fuel, food, and fertiliser prices. On top of this, rising internal and external debt service costs from the country’s infrastructure-led growth model, so applauded across the continent and beyond, adds additional strain.

The return of international economic support for peace building efforts will be indispensable to avoid these vast economic losses, protect livelihoods, and get Ethiopia’s ambitious development agenda back on track, including Prime Minister Abiy’s stated goal of large-scale poverty reduction.

A clear first step now would be to explore how to reinvigorate development and service delivery across the entire country, to bring about a recovery in health, education, social protection, and other areas. None of the parties to the conflicts in Ethiopia are keen to lose this progress in development – some of the legitimacy of the main elite groups involved in the conflict within their communities has stemmed from this progress over the last few decades. It is therefore a good idea to begin to reconnect with this.

This is an area where the international community – especially the United Nations, multilateral development banks, and bilateral donors – must play a key role. An international reconstruction forum and transparent donor platform to coordinate the process – not unlike what the G7 and the European Commission recently convened in Berlin for Ukraine – could be a first step. This can help define a clear upside to peace for many stakeholders across the many different conflicts – not just the one involving Tigray.

We continue to call for accelerating the process with the IMF, and the start of an IMF programme, given the further collateral damage its absence will do, to the prospects for future peace and stability.

It is unclear what the political or tactical gains could be from delaying further a bailout of the Ethiopian economy. More instability across the country is hardly going to bring more peace and stability across the country. It will alienate public opinion further from the West. Further implosion of the Ethiopian economy will no doubt offer ammunition to conflict hawks that may seek to gamble on intensifying the conflict, or seek closer links with Russia or other rogue parties. 

The massive damage to economic and social infrastructure in Tigray has created an obstacle for peace. Launching a commission focusing on the reconstruction of war-affected areas of Tigray, northern Amhara, and Afar regions could provide a shared project between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia.

This could be linked to, but separate to, the overall reinvigoration of development efforts mentioned above, but as it would include more considerable infrastructure recovery investment, it could also be kept separate. Involving the World Bank, but also other infrastructure vehicles (including the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, and even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as bilateral aid agencies), may be helpful in terms of providing the right incentives from the start. 

Most investments only bring a return after several years. Mobilising the business community as influencers for peace and stability, away from the standard political and government channels, is a route that is not currently being considered but that could be fruitful in terms of locking in players on all sides of the conflict into the longer-term process of peacebuilding. In neighbouring Somaliland, for example, the business community can be credited with bringing an end to the civil war and sustaining peace since the 1990s, despite the continuing instability in large parts of the rest of Somalia.

Conversations on recovery, the nature of the economy post-conflict, and restoring national and regional trade might seem of no great import, but, given the influence of such business people, they could become useful influencers for achieving a reasonable compromise, contributing to rebuilding some trust among influential players. There is no need for such a group to operate publicly, and indeed informal processes may be more effective.